Information Operations: Electronic Warfare & Military Deception
Information Operations (DSS)
Note: Technology enables both indirect and subversive means of information control and propaganda dissemination. These methods exist under the umbrella term, soft power or non-kinetic and they are extremely useful in dealing with adversarial opponents or those individuals deemed a security risk to the status quo elite who wish to remain not only in power, but also to secure the structural integrity of a political and financial regime. For anti-humans this presents unique opportunities to remain unchallenged.
Information Operations combines a unique set of core capabilities, which integrate both systems (EW, CNO) with content (MILDEC, PSYOP, OPSEC) to achieve information superiority and military advantage. These core capabilities involve non-kinetic or soft power methods in order to "influence the behavior of target audiences by changing their ability to make decisions, while simultaneously defending the friendly capability to make proper decisions" (U.S. Army 2011, p. 3). This would entail physical attack against adversary systems and key decision makers utilizing technology based activities, which correspond with the three conceptual dimensions of the information environment: connectivity, content and cognitive. As DOD (2014) identified, "The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information." Hence, the physical dimension encompasses elements of both EW and CNO, in relation to the supporting infrastructure. "It is a defused network connected across national, economic, and geographical boundaries"(ibid). As Paul (2008) notes, "these are conduits for information rather than content" (p. 83).
Electronic Warfare (EW) utilizes military capabilities associated with electromagnetic and directed energy in order to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum or directly attack an adversary. As Paul (2008) notes, "doctrine divides EW into three categories: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP) and electronic warfare support (ES)" (ibid). Military deception (MILDEC) involves actions, which deliberately mislead adversary targets. This involves measures in relation to "friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, which cause an adversary to take specific actions that, will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission" (U.S. Army 2011, p. 6). This correlates (EP) electronic protection, which involves both passive and active methods to protect personnel, facilities and equipment from adversary attempts at using (EW) electronic warfare to degrade, neutralize or destroy friendly operations. DOD (2014) JP 313 highlights the importance of integration. As such, "The IO cell provides a coordinating mechanism for enabling or integrating MILDEC with other IRCs" (p. 37). This corresponds with Paul (2008) concerning deception and the seamless alliance with other capabilities. Considering, "MILDEC by itself has no force structure, it is just using some other capability in a deceptive way" (p. 48).
An ideal assimilation of EW and MILDEC dates to WWII, illustrated by the use of EW aircraft jamming enemy radar, in an effort to protect inbound bombers. However, no bombers would take advantage of this jamming window, but instead ingressing target airspace at a different time or space. This is illustrative of the integrative aspects of IO, as EW provided the electronic protection through jamming efforts, while MILDEC diverted attention from the actual strategic plan. This example also reveals one of the central distinctions between EW and MILDEC as both comprise core capabilities, yet each represents a unique content or system. As such, MILDEC, being content oriented, has no specific forces assigned to this capability. "MILDEC is a capability that is employed, even without forces specific to that capability" (Paul 2008, p. 71). It is also important to note that MILDEC begins with a specific objective. This also correlates equally with EW activities, which are specific in nature such as airborne communications jamming with an EC-130H or SIGINT focused Army EW assets. The statement, "MILDEC objectives must concisely state what it is that the adversary will be made to do or not do" (ibid) correlate with the mission specific activities of which EW capabilities are tasked with achieving.
Due to the systems orientation of EW, much like CNO and unlike MILDEC, technical and financial concerns generate sufficient challenges. "EW must always keep up with existing technology and rapidly chase new innovations" (Paul 2008, p. 92). In addition, "Meeting this challenge is not just a technical challenge, but a financial one" (ibid). This is reflective of the various military branches whose specialties entail development of unique EW tools to address unique and specific objectives such as the Army SIGINT efforts to combat IED usage as opposed to the airborne jamming methods utilized by the USAF. Considering MILDEC is ubiquitous and without a specialized force structure, it does not have these inherent limitations, as application consists of integration with all core capabilities of IO.
References:
Paul, C. (2008) Information Operations: Doctrine and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger.
U.S. Army. (2011) Information Operations Primer: Fundamentals of Information Operations.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2014) Joint Publication 313, Information Operations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense.